Discourse metaphors: the link between figurative language and habitual analogies by Zinken, Joerg
 1 
Discourse metaphors: The link between figurative language and habitual analogies 
Jörg Zinken 
 




Cognitive linguists have long been interested in analogies people habitually use in 
thinking and speaking, but little is known about the nature of the relationship between 
verbal behaviour and such analogical schemas. This article proposes that discourse 
metaphors are an important link between the two. Discourse metaphors are verbal 
expressions containing a construction that evokes an analogy negotiated in the 
discourse community. Results of an analysis of metaphors in a corpus of newspaper 
texts support the prediction that regular analogies are form-specific, i.e. bound to 
particular lexical items. Implications of these results for assumptions about the 
generality of habitual analogies are discussed. 
 




Analogies play a fundamental role in some of the most impressive capabilities of the 
human mind. The detection of analogies is a driving force in the development and 
acquisition of relational concepts (Gentner 2003), and figurative analogies help us to 
agree or disagree on relatively intangible topics, from temporal relations (Boroditsky 
2000; Evans 2004) to international politics (Musolff 2004; Zinken 2003).  
Much research in cognitive linguistics has described possible analogies underlying 
figurative talk about such intangible topics (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 1980; e.g., 
Clausner and Croft 1997; Grady 1999).1 However, the nature of the relationship 
between language use and analogical schemas remains unclear. Let us assume we 
read in a newspaper article of a nation-state that is described as a house built by many 
generations, with a fundament of stable values and open doors for newcomers. Do we 
construct a state – house analogy to make figurative sense of this utterance? This 
might suggest that the particular lexical items used in an utterance are a factor in the 
development of habitual analogical schemas. Or is this figurative usage understood as 
an instance of a more general institution – building analogy that has been abstracted 
from countless instances of talking about different types of institutions in terms of 
different types of buildings (as might be suggested on the basis of Lakoff 1993)? This 
would suggest that habitual analogical schemas are the result of the members of a 
language community making the same abstraction over the utterances they encounter. 
Or maybe language just expresses very general analogies that are formed 
independently of language itself – maybe it is a preconceptual intuition of equating 
organisation with physical structure that leads us to talk about a nation-state as a 
house (as might be suggested on the basis of Grady and Johnson 2003; see also 
Lakoff and Johnson 1999)? This would suggest that habitual analogical schemas are a 
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natural epiphenomenon of human ontogenesis (as proposed most explicitly in the new 
afterword to Lakoff and Johnson 2003).  
 
Cognitive linguistic approaches to metaphor have repeatedly been criticised for being 
too vague with regard to the link they assume to hold between analogical schemas and 
language use (Murphy 1996; Jackendoff and Aaron 1991; Vervaeke and Kennedy 
1995; Stern 2000). Being explicit about the link one assumes between behavioural 
data and theoretical constructs is essential for a falsifiable account of semantic 
schematization in general, and figurative language and thought in particular. In the 
present paper, a possible link is proposed and evidence in its support sought. The 
proposal follows the first of the three possibilities broadly outlined above: that the 
particular vehicles used in active metaphors (Goatly 1997; Goddard 2004) are the 
driving force in the negotiation of habitual analogies. 
 
Section two provides some conceptual groundwork. This involves a brief description 
of the approach to figurative language that the present study is based on, and an 
introduction to the construct of discourse metaphors, the crucial nexus between 
language use and habitual analogies. Section three reports a corpus analysis of 
discourse metaphors, which assesses the prediction that repeatedly evidenced 
metaphorical meanings are form-specific, i.e. that the particular lexical items used in 
discourse are associated with particular figurative usages. In section four, the present 
approach will be discussed in the context of alternative views of figurative language 
in cognitive linguistics, and section five presents some conclusions.  
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2. Figurative language in creative and conventional meaning construction 
2.1. The lexical concepts and cognitive models approach to figurative language  
The lexical concepts and cognitive models approach to figurative language is 
concerned with the functions of the semantic structure associated with particular 
constructions in figurative meaning construction (Evans and Zinken in print). The 
approach makes a distinction between two types of knowledge structure involved in 
linguistic meaning construction: lexical concepts and cognitive models. Lexical 
concepts are language-specific, protean representations, governed by conventions. 
Lexical concepts are part of all linguistic constructions, from morphemes to syntactic 
constructions. They do not encode the meaning of a word (or morpheme, or syntactic 
construction). Rather, they can be thought of as instructions to access a particular area 
of encyclopaedic knowledge.  
These bodies of encyclopaedic knowledge are broadly termed cognitive models, but 
they should not be thought of as representations written in a symbolic code, as a 
symbolic ‘language of thought’ (Fodor 1975). Rather, encyclopaedic knowledge 
might be represented in the ‘language’ of the specific modality in which the 
experience was made (Barsalou 1999) – visual, auditory, or, indeed verbal, for 
example in cases of learning through verbal instruction. 
Linguistic forms provide prompts for meaning construction (Evans 2006). When an 
utterance feels conventional, this means that a meaning that is relevant in the current 
context was constructed rapidly and seemingly effortlessly. When an utterance feels 
figurative, this means that the construction of a relevant meaning required the listener 
to access knowledge that is, in the given context, not directly accessed by the vehicle. 
The more work has to be invested in construing a relevant meaning, the more 
figurative the utterance is bound to feel.2 The difference can be illustrated with the 
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utterances “this thing is a bulldozer” and “Robert is a bulldozer” (discussed in Carston 
2002; see also Gibbs and Tendahl 2006). Both utterances involve the syntactic 
construction “x is a y”, associated with a lexical concept that we can call [class 
inclusion] and that we know invites us to put x into the category of y, together with 
other, similar representatives of the category. The lexical concept associated with the 
deictic NP “this thing”, maybe accompanied by a pointing gesture or a head nod, 
immediately guides us to attend to the relevant object which must be given in the 
discourse context – e.g., it might guide us to look at a particular vehicle. The lexical 
concept associated with the form “bulldozer” makes our knowledge of a certain type 
of work vehicle directly accessible – knowledge that might for most speakers of 
English be restricted to visual experience.  
The utterance “Robert is a bulldozer” cannot be understood in this straightforward 
manner, because the syntactic invitation to include Robert, a person, into the category 
of bulldozers leads to a contradiction. Let us assume that this utterance is made in the 
context of discussing Robert’s interpersonal qualities. The knowledge required to 
perform a class-inclusion with bulldozers as the class in question, which for many 
speakers presumably involves the vague knowledge that bulldozers are a type of 
machine used in certain work contexts, will not be useful for meaning construction in 
such a context. So we explore the vehicle further, and maybe mentally simulate the 
flattening effect that the motion of a bulldozer has on the earth it drives over. The 
simulation of physical ‘flattening’ might, in the given context, evoke the force 
dynamics that conventionally inhere in the way speakers of English talk about 
interpersonal relations involving ‘pressure’, ‘persuading’, or ‘urging’ (Talmy 2000). 
Once structures in the two domains – say, the domain of bulldozing and the domain of 
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bullying – are matched, the analogy is established and bulldozing-imagery can be 
used to elaborate on Robert’s social behaviour. 
Lexical concepts place an order on the accessibility of encyclopaedic knowledge, and 
order which is usage-driven. Encyclopaedic knowledge that is frequently relevant in 
the usage of a particular construction becomes more accessible. This leads to a 
situation where different kinds of knowledge can be immediately accessible through 
one particular lexical item in appropriate contexts, i.e. to polysemy. Consider the 
alternative, though equally unfavourable, assessment of Robert’s interpersonal 
qualities: “Robert has no warmth”. While this utterance could just about conceivably 
be intended in a reading referring to temperature – in the context of talk about 
Robert’s corpse maybe – in a context of talk about personality, the form “warmth” 
will be directly understood as referring to Robert’s lack of empathy and engagement 
with others. In such a case, the process of meaning construction does not involve the 
matching of structures across domains and the construction of an analogy. The 
repeated use of warmth in the context of social relations has lead to the entrenchment 
of a separate lexical concept [warmth*], which directly provides access to knowledge 
of the relevant affective experience.3 At this point, what is required for meaning 
construction is the selection of the contextually appropriate lexical concept (Evans 
and Zinken in print; see also Giora 1999). In other words, the process of meaning 
construction becomes one of ‘vertical’ class-inclusion (including Robert in the class 
of people with no warmth’) and ceases to be one of ‘horizontal’ analogy (Bowdle and 
Gentner 2005). Whether such conventionalised usages should be termed metaphor is a 
matter of definition (Cameron 1999; Gentner et al. 2001; Glucksberg 2003). 
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2.2. Discourse metaphors and regular analogies 
Schemas used regularly for analogical reasoning have been studied on the basis of 
naturally-occurring verbal behaviour in cognitive-linguistic discourse analysis 
(Musolff 2004; Chilton 1996; Zinken, Hellsten, and Nerlich in print). For example, 
debates of European Union expansions are framed by house- and journey-metaphors 
(Musolff 2000; Bolotova and Zinken 2004), debates of international political relations 
frequently use marriage-metaphors (Musolff 2004), and debates on scientific 
achievements are often framed by race-metaphors (Nerlich 2006).  
Analogies in public discourse use stereotypical representations of everyday situations 
to provide evaluative perspectives on contested topics (Musolff 2006). However, the 
figurative meaning of such schemas is not obvious. While the speaker proposing a 
particular metaphor has a specific figurative meaning in mind, new metaphors are 
initially open to several interpretations, and can be used for opposing evaluations 
(Hellsten 2000). This openness of analogical schemas leads to a period of negotiation, 
in which discourse participants aim to establish a ‘conceptual pact’ (Brennan and 
Clark 1996) regarding the meaning of the expression by repeating, reformulating, or 
rejecting the metaphor. A well-documented example is the history of the metaphor of 
the "common European House", brought into European public discourses by Mikhail 
Gorbachev in the mid-1980s (Chilton and Ilyin 1993; Zinken 2002; Zybatow 1995). 
While Gorbachev intended to convey a sense of the common responsibility of the 
states of Europe for the "common house", Western journalists picking up the phrase 
mainly thought about the freedom of moving from room to room that is possible 
within a family house. In other words, Gorbachev had intended to highlight the need 
for a common security policy by alluding to the stereotypical knowledge relating to 
the structure and stability of a house. The preferred interpretation of the metaphor in 
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Western media, on the other hand, used the stereotypical knowledge of the social life 
of a family home as an analogue for post-cold-war relations in Europe (Chilton and 
Ilyin 1993).  
Importantly in the current context, differences in the knowledge conventionally 
accessed by speakers when using the lexical item house (or the Russian dom) have led 
to diverging figurative interpretations. The experience of detached family houses and 
the accompanying positive evaluations are relatively prominent in the associations 
that Western Europeans have with houses. For speakers of Russian, on the other hand, 
the mental image of apartment blocks is relatively salient in associations with the 
lexical item dom (Chilton and Ilyin 1993). The same phenomenon should in principle 
exist within a language community: each speaker has some idiosyncratic associations 
with the word house, although we would expect a set of shared associations to say that 
somebody knows the meaning of the word (see Wierzbicka 1985). The development 
of a novel metaphor into a habitually constructed analogical schema therefore 
involves the repeated use of a particular form as the vehicle, and the accompanying 
negotiation of a shared figurative interpretation. 
 
Constructions that are commonly used as metaphor vehicles to express a particular, 
negotiated analogical meaning will be termed discourse metaphors (Zinken, Hellsten, 
and Nerlich in print). Discourse metaphors therefore constitute an intermediate stage 
in the life course of a successful figurative expression – from an innovative analogy to 
a conventional lexical concept. The difference between a discourse metaphor and a 
creative metaphor is that the analogy evoked by a discourse metaphor is part of the 
primary cognitive model profile directly accessed by the given lexical concept in the 
appropriate context (Evans and Zinken 2005). While in the case of creative 
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metaphors, encyclopaedic knowledge has to be ‘searched’ for the hearer to construct a 
relevant meaning, the relevant analogical schema is easily recalled in the case of 
discourse metaphors. This means that the process of meaning construction becomes 
more similar to conventional meaning construction. When the lexical item house is 
modified by the adjective European, the analogical schema of different countries 
living together like the members of a family in its home is directly constructed in a 
discourse where this is the negotiated interpretation. Still, the conventionalisation has 
not reached the point where [European community] would be a conventional lexical 
concept associated with the lexical item house, independent of the lexical concept 
[house]. The often clichéd feel of discourse metaphors comes from the fact that, on 
the one hand, the intended interpretation is readily available in the appropriate context 
but, on the other hand, the utterance still feels figurative because this interpretation is 
achieved using a form that in most contexts has a different referent. 
 
In sum, a discourse metaphor is a linguistic expression containing a construction that, 
in the appropriate context, prompts the speaker/hearer to construct an analogical 
meaning that has been negotiated in the discourse. This means that discourse 
metaphors are form-specific in the sense that the analogy is evoked by a particular 
linguistic unit, i.e. a particular conventional form-meaning pairing.4 The discourse in 
question can vary in scope from a few speakers discussing a particular topic to all 
speakers communicating with mutually comprehensible utterances in a language 
community.  
 
This view of the development of analogical schemas predicts that discourse 
metaphors are form-specific, i.e. bound to particular linguistic constructions. This 
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follows because the common ground for the negotiation of a figurative interpretation 
is the stereotypical encyclopaedic knowledge accessed by conventional lexical 
concepts associated with the form of the vehicle. We should therefore expect that 
extended meanings are motivated by the particular conventions associated with a 
lexical item. The assumption that discourse metaphors are form-specific leads to the 
prediction that different lexical items with similar or overlapping conventional usages, 
which belong to the same superordinate category, function differently as metaphor 
vehicles. This prediction is assessed in the following section. 
 
3. Are discourse metaphors form-specific? 
The aim of the study reported in this section was to see whether corpus data support 
the prediction that discourse metaphors are form-specific. It is predicted that lexical 
items that have similar and overlapping conventional usages function differently as 
vehicles of discourse metaphors. Alternatively, it could be that the relevant meanings 
used in figurative verbal behaviour are independent of particular linguistic 
constructions, but instead tied to superordinate categories, and that therefore lexical 
items that are conventionally used in the same contexts take on the same figurative 
functions in active metaphorical contexts in discourse.  
 
It is an open empirical question how frequently a lexical item must have been used 
with the same figurative meaning in order for it to become a discourse metaphor. For 
the purposes of this article, the minimal criterion will be that a lexical item must have 
been used at least twice in the corpus with the same figurative meaning to have the 
potential of being a discourse metaphor. This generous criterion has been chosen 




Corpus. More than 8,000 metaphors were annotated in a sub-sample of the Wende-
corpus of the Institute for German Language in Mannheim, Germany (see Baranov 
and Zinken 2003), which comprises approximately 3.3 million words. It contains 
newspaper texts and, to a lesser extent, politicians’ speeches from mid-1989 to the 
end of 1990 relating to the end of state socialism in Eastern Germany and Eastern 
Europe.  
Procedure. Annotation proceeded in a corpus-driven manner (McEnery, Tono, and 
Xiao 2006). Texts were read in their entirety, and each identified metaphor was 
annotated using a set of meta-language descriptors (see Baranov 2006, for details). 
Data-collection continued until 8,000 metaphors were annotated.  
Only active metaphors were annotated. Metaphors were considered active when an 
understanding of the utterance required meta-lexical awareness (Goddard 2004), when 
the author made use of an interference between lexical concepts (as when someone 
would refer to Robert as a “tropically warm” person, leading to an interference 
between the two conventional lexical concepts, the temperature-related [warmth] 
made salient by the adverb, and the emotion-related [warmth*] made salient by the 
context), or when the figurativity of the expression was highlighted with the use of 
“tuning devices” (Cameron and Deignan 2003) such as inverted commas or phrases 
such as “so to speak”. Discussions between coders were used in the first phase of 
annotation to resolve unclear cases.  
Four broad vehicle categories, building, container, path, and transport, were chosen 
for analysis. Only nominal metaphors were included. This produced 36 metaphor 
vehicles. The 36 lexical items were identified to be used metaphorically 266 times in 
the corpus (cf. Appendix). In order to increase the comparability of lexical items, they 
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were attributed to levels of categorisation. Two independent coders classified each of 
the 36 lexical items as being at the superordinate, the basic, or the subordinate level. 
Coders were provided with brief definitions of each level that were formulated on the 
basis of Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Brae (1976) and asked to make 
quick, intuitive decisions. Cohen’s kappa showed good agreement, K = .82. A third 
coder rated all 36 items, and this coder’s judgements were used to resolve 
disagreements between the first two coders. Five lexical items from the four 
categories were judged to belong to a superordinate level of catgorisation, 22 to the 
basic level, and nine to a subordinate level. This bias towards the basic level was 
expected, since the basic level is the default level for reference (Glucksberg 2001). 
The analysis was further restricted to lexical items from the basic level. 
Lexical items were used metaphorically with very different frequency, both in 
absolute and in relative terms. The two most frequently used vehicles were Weg ‘path’ 
(118 occurrences), and Haus ‘house’ (53 occurrences). Each of the remaining 34 
vehicles was annotated less than 10 times. Some lexical items were relatively rarely 
used with metaphorical functions, others relatively frequently (see Appendix). 
However, these numbers need to be treated with caution because of the procedure of 
annotation. We know that the lexical item Ruine (“ruin”) occurs 51 times in the whole 
corpus, and that at least seven of these occurrences are metaphorical. However, it 
could be that more than seven occurrences are metaphorical. The same applies to the 
other lexical items. 
Vehicle-pairs which were similar in their conventional meanings recorded in 
dictionaries were selected for comparison. The selected vehicle pairs were: path – 
course; bastion – fortress; kettle – pot; and boat – ship. Figurative meanings that were 
 14 
expressed at least twice with the same vehicle were considered to have the potential of 
being a discourse metaphor. 
Materials. Two dictionaries were used to compare the figurative functions of 
conventionally similar lexical items. These were the electronic versions of the digital 
lexicon of the German language in the 20th century (Das digitale Wörterbuch der 
deutschen Sprache des 20.Jahrhunderts, referred to as digital lexicon in the 
following), and the Bertelsmann lexicon (Bertelsmann Wörterbuch, referred to as 
Bertelsmann lexicon in the following). 
 
3.2. Results  
The aim of the analysis was to find out whether lexical concepts belonging to the 
same superordinate category were used with the same or with different metaphorical 
functions.  
Path – Course. The conventional meanings of Weg ‘path’ and Bahn ‘lane/course’ 
overlap. Both can refer to paths that have developed in an unplanned manner through 
the activity of walking, or as the result of intentional construction to enable the 
reaching of a goal. The meaning of Weg is explained using the term Bahn, and vice 
versa, in the digital lexicon. There are also differences in the conventional uses of the 
two lexical items. The Bertelsmann lexicon emphasises that the word Bahn also refers 
to a pre-determined trajectory of motion, e.g., of planets. The lexeme Weg, but not 
Bahn, also refers to the distance that must be crossed to reach a goal. Furthermore, 
Weg is conventionally used to refer to the manner of executing an action, similar to 
the English “a way to solve the problem”, and to the goal-directedness of actions (“the 
path to freedom”). A further conventional usage of Bahn is to express the idea of 
restrictions: “in geregelten Bahnen handeln” (literally ‘to act in regulated courses’, 
meaning ‘acting within certain boundaries’). 
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The word Weg ‘path’ is frequently used in the corpus in its conventional meanings of 
[manner of action] and [goal-directedness of action] to discuss varied political 
activities. Active metaphors using the vehicle Weg ‘path’ (N=118) exploit the 
interference between ‘Weg [goal-directedness]’ and the lexical concept with the more 
‘concrete’, i.e. intersubjectively available, referent ‘Weg [path]’ to construct an 
analogy in which a particular political activity or task is presented as a path that has to 
be traversed. The topics of such metaphors are varied, but one political task that is 
repeatedly talked about as a path to be travelled is the unification of the two German 
states.  
 
(1) [...] wir haben nie versucht , irgendwelche Stolpersteine in den Weg der deutschen Einigung zu 
legen. (Berliner Zeitung, 08/10/1990) 
[we have never tried to put any stumbling blocks into the path of German unity] 
(2) [...] der Weg zur deutschen Einheit ist mit praktischen Problemen gepflastert. (Rheinischer 
Merkur, 20/04/1990) 
[The path to German unity is paved with practical problems] 
 
These figurative usages of Weg ‘path’ emphasise the effort required to reach a 
political goal.  
The word Bahn ‘course’ is frequently used in public discourse to express its 
conventional meaning of restrictions and regulations. Metaphors using the vehicle 
Bahn ‘course’ (N=6) exploit the interference between the lexical concepts ‘Bahn 
[regulation]’ and ‘Bahn [trajectory]’ to present a development analogically as an 
object following a trajectory. All metaphorical usages of Bahn in the current corpus 
express this figurative meaning. However, none of the metaphor topics is expressed 
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more than once, so that Bahn should not be considered a discourse metaphor of the 
Wende-discourse. In example (3), a career is conceptualised as an object following a 
pre-given course: 
 
(3) Unter Führung der SED sei die DDR dank der schöpferischen Arbeit des ganzen Volkes von 
Jahr zu Jahr als ein stabiler Eckpfeiler des Sozialismus und des Friedens , als reale Alternative 
zum Kapitalismus erstarkt. Der Weg habe natürlich nicht immer über glatte Bahnen geführt. 
(Berliner Zeitung, 06/10/1989) 
[Under the leadership of the SED, the GDR had gathered strength, thanks to the creative work 
of the entire people, as a stable pillar of socialism and peace, as a real alternative to capitalism. 
Of course, this path had not always led along a smooth course].  
 
Not a single figurative usage of the lexeme Weg ‘path’ uses this vehicle to express the 
figurative meaning expressed with Bahn ‘course’, that of a pre-given trajectory, or 
vice versa. In conclusion, then, we can say that although the lexical items Weg and 
Bahn overlap in their contexts of conventional usage, they do not overlap in their 
figurative functions. 
 
Bastion – Fortress. The lexical items Bastion ‘bastion’ and Festung ‘fortress’ are 
similar in their conventional meanings. Both refer to military fortifications. They 
differ in that bastions were parts of a fortress, built on its outskirts. Bastions became 
important with the invention of guns as an outer post for defence.  
 
The lexeme Bastion ‘bastion’ is used as a metaphor vehicle (N=2) exclusively to refer 
to elements of the state-socialism of the GDR – to the state as a whole in one case, to 
the Berlin wall in the other. This association of the GDR with a bastion was well 
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established in the official public GDR language, which had branded the GDR, 
somewhat paradoxically, as a Bastion des Friedens ‘bastion of peace’. The active 
metaphorical usages in the Wende-corpus, however, clearly play on the original 
battle-function of bastions. They are used to express the antagonism between the 
state-socialist Eastern Europe and the capitalist Western Europe: 
 
(4) Partei und Regierung der DDR wüßten, daß sie auf einer "vorgeschobenen Bastion des 
Sozialismus" stünden (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/08/1989) 
  [Party and government knew that they were standing on an “outer bastion of socialism”] 
 
Knowledge of the original function and structure of medieval bastions is likely to vary 
considerably across speakers of German. The minimum knowledge required to make 
figurative sense of (4) might be merely that bastions had a function in military 
conflicts between two parties. Of course, such an assumption about bastions is 
strongly suggested by the metaphor’s topic itself – the conflict between socialism and 
capitalism.  
 
Metaphors using the vehicle Festung ‘fortress’ (N=2), on the other hand, are variable 
in the topics they take. The topics of the two usages in the corpus are Europe and 
legislation respectively. The metaphor of the European fortress expresses the 
impossibility for aspiring new members to enter into the European Union. The 
metaphor of a particular piece of legislation as a fortress expresses the (contested) 
immutability of that legislation:  
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(5) [...] aber die Väter und Mütter unserer Verfassung [...] haben beispielsweise die 5-%-
Klausel nie als eine Festung begriffen , die nicht eingenommen werden kann (Berliner 
Tagespost, 05/09/1989) 
 [but the fathers and mothers of our constitution have never understood the 5% stipulation 
as a fortress that cannot be captured.] 
 
In both usages, it is the idea of the impenetrability of a fortress that is figuratively 
exploited, not, as in the case of the bastion-metaphors, its military use in an 
antagonism between two parties. Although the lexeme Festung ‘fortress’ is not part of 
a discourse metaphor in this corpus, because no topic is conceptualised twice using 
this vehicle, it is interesting to note that the same relational encyclopaedic 
knowledge– that of impenetrability – is relevant in both contexts in which the vehicle 
Festung ‘fortress’ is used.5  
The knowledge that speakers of German have of bastions and fortresses is presumably 
much vaguer than the knowledge they have of paths and courses. Indeed, the 
figurative interpretations of both bastion- and fortress-metaphors strongly rely on 
their topical context, as emphasised by interaction theories of metaphor (Black 1993 
[1979]). The lexical concept used as a vehicle clearly plays an important part in this 
interaction: as with path- and course-metaphors, the vehicle fortress is never used to 
express the figurative meaning expressed with bastion, and vice versa. 
Kettle – Pot. The lexical items Kessel ‘kettle’ and Topf ‘pot’ are very similar in their 
conventional meanings. Both refer to common household objects that are used in the 
preparation of meals. The digital lexicon describes both as predominantly large 
containers used for cooking. One difference is that as a household object, kettles are 
used exclusively as a kitchen tool – the heating of fluids is explicitly mentioned as a 
function in the digital lexicon and the Bertelsmann lexicon – whereas pots serve 
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various functions, including, e.g., the storage of food and the planting of flowers. 
Beyond the household, a different kind of Kessel ‘kettle’ was used in steam engine 
locomotives. 
Metaphors using the vehicle Kessel ‘kettle’ (N=6) regularly express the special 
situation in the GDR in late 1989: The so-called Monday demonstrations were 
increasingly putting ‘pressure’ on the GDR government to relax the restrictions on 
travelling abroad that existed for GDR citizens. ‘Releasing the pressure’ by allowing 
people to leave the GDR bore the danger of a mass emigration; restoring the 
restrictions bore the danger that the ‘kettle might explode’, i.e. the danger of a 
revolution: 
 
(6) [...] eine plötzliche Drosselung der großzügigen Genehmigung bei Westreisen und Ausreisen 
von DDR-Bürgern würde den Druck im Kessel der "Hinterbliebenen" schlagartig so sehr 
erhöhen, daß die SED-Führung sich erstmals vor einem neuen 17. Juni fürchten müßte. 
(Spiegel, 18/09/1989) 
 [A sudden curb in the generous permissions for GDR-citizens to travel to the West or emigrate 
would abruptly heighten the pressure in the kettle of the ones left behind so much that the SED 
government would for the first time have to fear a new 17th June.] 
 
(7) Schmidt über die Angst der SED: "der Druck muß unter dem Kessel bleiben. Die Führung 
drüben muß die Sorge haben, daß die DDR ausblutet. Nur dann bewegt sich wirklich etwas" 
(Bild, 11/11/1989) 
 [Schmidt on the fear in the SED: “The pressure must remain on the kettle. The government 
over there must be afraid that the GDR bleeds to death. Only then things will move] 
 
The kettle metaphor was a discourse metaphor in the Wende-discourse. The figurative 
meaning uses the idea of increasing pressure in a closed kettle that comes with 
increasing heat. The figurative use of this logic in a social context is aided by the 
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analogical force dynamics of physical and social pressure (Talmy 2000). For example, 
the pressure dynamics of the steam engine are embodied in a variety of German 
idioms, such as jemandem Dampf machen (‘to make steam for somebody’, i.e. to put 
pressure on somebody) or Dampf ablassen (‘to let off steam’, i.e. to release 
(psychological) pressure). It is possible that the figurative usages of this vehicle, in 
the given context, remind readers of the steam engine dynamics conventionally 
embodied in idioms of interpersonal pressure. Alternatively, it is possible that readers 
construct a figurative meaning on the basis of their own experience with the steam 
pressures involved in cooking.  
 
The vehicle Topf ‘pot’ (N=3), on the other hand, is used to criticise the lack of making 
important distinctions. The particular topics of the metaphor vary (including the 
discussion of company budgets, social groups, and regions within Germany), but the 
evaluation conveyed by this figurative expression is the same across contexts: 
 
(8) Fünf Prozent wären im gesamtdeutschen Topf gerade ein Prozent wert. (Stern, 02/08/1990) 
[Five percent [in the GDR] would be worth all but one percent in the entire German pot] 
 
This usage of the pot metaphor is clearly inspired by the idiom verschiedene Sachen 
in einen Topf werfen (‘to throw diverse things into one pot’) which expresses exactly 
the same evaluation as the pot metaphors in the corpus. Figurative usages of the 
vehicle pot cannot be considered discourse metaphors, because they are not used 
repeatedly to conceptualise the same topic. Again, the lexical items kettle and pot, 
despite their overlapping conventional usage, are never used to express the same 
figurative meaning.  
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Boat – Ship. Finally, the lexical items Boot ‘boat’ and Schiff ‘ship’ are similar in their 
conventional meanings. Both refer to basic types of vehicles used to travel on water. 
Differences include the following: a boat is defined as a small vehicle, whereas a ship 
tends to be bigger according to both the digital and the Bertelsmann lexicon. A boat is 
also technologically relatively simple, using rows or a sail for locomotion. A ship is 
technologically more complex, and steering a ship requires expert knowledge.  
Metaphors using the vehicle Boot ‘boat’ (N=7) express two figurative meanings more 
than once. The first of these is the idea of different people sharing a common interest 
in a particular situation: 
 
(9) […] aber wird dieses Gespenst nicht von der SED dazu benutzt , die Opposition ins Boot zu 
ziehen, um damit doch noch ans rettende Ufer gelangen zu können ? (Rheinischer Merkur, 
26/01/1990) 
[but isn’t this ghost being used by the SED to pull the opposition into the boat in order to be 
able to reach the safe bank after all?] 
 
This usage builds on the conventional meaning of the idiom ‘im gleichen Boot sitzen’ 
(‘to be sitting in one boat’), which means to have a shared interest or to be in a 
dangerous situation together.  
The other repeated usage of a boat metaphor refers to Germany as a boat – in which 
there is limited space for newcomers: 
 
(10) […] was bisher die Westdeutschen nur den aus aller Welt hereindrängenden Asylanten 
entgegengehalten haben, hören nun auch die Ankömmlinge aus der DDR: das Boot ist voll. 
(Spiegel, 14/08/1989) 
[people arriving from the GDR now get to hear what West Germans have so far only been 
telling asylum seekers coming from around the world: the boat is full] 
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Reference to limited space on the German ‘boat’ is a common form of rationalising 
anti-immigrant sentiments in public discourses beyond the one under consideration. 
Metaphors using the vehicle Schiff ‘ship’ (N=4) are used for other purposes. This 
vehicle is used in various contexts, e.g. to conceptualise a complex economic project, 
by referring to it as a ship going through heavy water: 
 
(11) […] daß es bei der Beratung am Wochenende stürmisch zuging, ist dem Umstand geschuldet, 
daß die "Wirtschaftskapitäne" ihr Schiff durch rauhe See steuern müssen. (Neues 
Deutschland, 11/12/1989) 
[The stormy atmosphere during the negotiations this weekend was due to the fact that the 
‘economy captains’ have to steer their ship through a rough sea] 
 
This metaphor of economic development as a ship on a course might be a discourse 
metaphor of public economy-related discourse more generally, although it has not 
been found repeatedly in this corpus. The metaphor involves the knowledge that a 
ship is a complex system the steering of which requires expertise – an interpretation 
which is again made salient by the context: 
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
Lexical items with similar conventional meanings were systematically used to express 
different figurative meanings in the present corpus. This was true for active metaphors 
of varying frequency and discourse scope. The GDR - kettle analogy, which was 
repeatedly used only in a very specific discourse (the Wende-discourse in late 1989), 
was never expressed using conventionally similar vehicles, such as pot. Similarly, the 
unification - path analogy, which is used frequently in public discourse across topic 
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domains, was never expressed using conventionally similar vehicles, such as course. 
No counterevidence to the qualitative observations reported here was found. That is, 
there was no occurrence of, e.g., a path metaphor expressing a figurative meaning that 
was expressed in another context with a course metaphor. This result supports the 
prediction that the conventional semantics of particular linguistic constructions are 
associated with particular figurative usages. 
 
4. General discussion 
Lexical items belonging, in their conventional function, to the same superordinate 
category differ systematically in their behaviour as metaphor vehicles. Even lexemes 
with very similar and overlapping conventional meanings do not overlap in their 
extended meanings in active metaphorical usage. These results support the prediction 
that form-specific lexical concepts are a factor in the development of habitual 
analogies. 
 
How generalisable are these findings from newspaper discourse on post-communist 
transformation to the development of habitual analogies in general? Maybe only local 
and context-specific topics (such as the changing preoccupations of public discourse) 
are understood via the specific semantics of linguistic constructions, whereas more 
general topics are understood via general and more abstract representations. For 
example, some research suggests that time is an abstract domain which is understood 
through general motion schemas (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Boroditsky 2000; 
Gentner, Imai, and Boroditsky 2002). However, Evans’ (2004) study of the lexeme 
time suggests that this might not be the case. For example, the deictic motion verbs 
come and go are used to express a moment-sense of time (the time has come to take 
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some action). Verbs lexicalising the velocity of motion, on the other hand, are used to 
express a duration-sense of time (time drags when you’re bored). These expressions 
are now conventional and unlikely to be understood metaphorically (see Gentner et al. 
2001). Nevertheless, the systematic differences in meaning expressed by different 
verbs of ‘temporal motion’ suggest that the semantic representations conventionally 
associated with linguistic constructions play a role in the figurative elaboration of 
concepts in general.  
 
Earlier work on habitual analogies in cognitive linguistics has formulated these at a 
more general level. In particular, proponents of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have 
suggested that metaphors in language reflect quite general metaphorical schemas in 
concept structure:  
 
(12) “One tends not to find mappings like A LOVE RELATIONSHIP IS A CAR or A LOVE RELATIONSHIP 
IS A BOAT. Instead, one tends to find both basic level cases (e.g., both cars and boats), which 
indicates that the generalisation is one level higher, at the superordinate level of the vehicle. In 
the hundreds of cases of conventional mappings studied so far, this prediction has been borne 
out: it is superordinate categories that are used in mappings.” (Lakoff 1993, p. 212) 
 
How do the results of the current study relate to this assertion? The present analysis 
has shown that lexical items with overlapping conventional usage differ in their 
behaviour as metaphor vehicles. But would it maybe be possible to generalise over 
them anyway? Consider the vehicles kettle and pot. These vehicles are used to convey 
different figurative conceptualisations: that of social pressures in the case of kettle, 
that of an undivided community in the case of pot. Still, both vehicles conventionally 
refer to types of containers, and both are used in relation to a nation-state - so maybe 
we could hypothesise that people use an analogical schema A NATION-STATE IS A 
CONTAINER in the comprehension of these utterances? This would seem consistent 
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with earlier formulations in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, such as the one in (12). 
However, assuming that the general mapping NATION-STATE – CONTAINER is 
psychologically real, we would still need to assume the psychological reality of the 
more specific analogies social dynamics in a state – steam pressure in a kettle and set 
of regions – undivided contained space in a pot. This follows because if the general 
mapping NATION-STATE – CONTAINER was the only psychologically real analogical 
schema, the systematic differences in the figurative meanings evoked by particular 
lexical concepts could not be explained. However, if we assume that a more specific 
analogical schema such as social dynamics in a state – steam pressure in a kettle is 
constructed online in the comprehension of the respective figurative utterances, it is 
unclear what exactly the function of the more general mapping NATION-STATE – 
CONTAINER would be. In other words, it cannot be decided on the grounds of verbal 
behaviour data whether such general mappings are a psychologically real additional 
layer of analogical schemas, or whether they are a post-hoc artefact of sorting 
utterances on the part of the researcher. 
 
More recent formulations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory regard habitual analogies 
as not at all necessarily linked to language. Rather, such schemas (‘primary 
metaphors’) are assumed to naturally arise in pre-linguistic, embodied experience. 
They might, but need not be expressed in language:  
 
(13) “When the embodied experiences in the world are universal, then the corresponding primary 
metaphors are universally acquired. […] These conceptual universals contribute [my 
emphasis, J.Z.] to linguistic universals, for example, how time is expressed in languages 
around the world […].” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 56-57) 
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On the one hand, leaving the relationship between verbal behaviour and assumed 
schemas unclear is problematic for a cognitive-linguistic theory of conceptualisation. 
On the other hand, it does seem plausible that figurative meaning construction is 
constrained by the embodiment of human cognition. Whether this embodiment takes 
the form of a set of ‘primary metaphors’ or not is another question that is not 
addressable using verbal behaviour data.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Some cognitive linguistic work on metaphor has established a rhetorical divide 
between scholars who treat metaphor as a matter of thought and scholars for whom 
metaphor is ‘merely’ a matter of language (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980). However, 
it is unclear what it would mean to say that metaphor is ‘merely’ a matter of language. 
Making meaning with verbal means necessarily involves thinking. The dissociation of 
language and conceptualisation has hindered the cognitive-linguistic study of 
figurative conceptualisation from studying the phenomenon in its full complexity. A 
look at other species shows that the use of analogy is the exception rather than the rule 
in animal cognition, and that in crucial ways it probably is a matter of language 
(Gentner 2003). Analogy predominantly makes use of relational knowledge (cf. 
Gentner et al. 2001; Kintsch 2001). Given the relative difficulty of relational thought, 
external forms (as material symbols, Clark 2006) might be a crucial scaffold for 
relational imagination.  
 
Methodologically, we need an account of the link we assume between analogical (or 
other figurative) schemas and verbal behaviour, because only then can we start 
making falsifiable claims, and only then can the cognitive-linguistic study of 
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figurative language enter fully into the debates of the cognitive sciences. The 
construct of discourse metaphors is an attempt to bridge the gap between habitual 
analogies and verbal behaviour.  
 
Discourse metaphors occupy a middle ground in the life-course of a successful 
metaphor, from innovation to conventional conceptualisation. They exemplify the 
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is associated with effort in meaning construction, see Coulson and Petten (2002). 
3. The asterisk is conventionally used in relevance-theoretic literature to indicate an 
abstracted category, see Carston (2002). 
4. The entrainment of figurative meanings might be form-specific in an even stronger 
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Lexical-concepts used in the study (English gloss in parentheses). Items grouped by 
category and level of schematicity, and sorted by frequency. The first number refers to 
annotations of metaphorical usages, the second to overall frequency in the Wende-corpus. 
 
Vehicle category Superordinate level Basic level Subordinate level 





























 Mühle (mill) (1/10)  
 
 Stall (barn)(1/30)  
 
   














 Bahn (course)(6/93)  
 
 Pfad (pathway)(3/7)  
 
   




 Faß (barrel)(4/26) Mülleimer (dustbin)(1/6) 
 
 Topf (pot)(3/38) Pulle (bottle)(1/5) 
 






 Kiste (box)(1/22)  
    




 Schiff (ship)(4/29) Kahn (barge)(1/22) 
 
 Karren (cart)(1/12) U-Boot (submarine)(1/2) 
 
   
 
 
